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IS ZIPPO'S SLIDING SCALE A SLIPPERY
SLOPE OF UNCERTAINTY? A CASE FOR
ABOLISHING WEB SITE INTERACTIVITY
AS A CONCLUSIVE FACTOR IN ASSESSING
MINIMUM CONTACTS IN CYBERSPACE
JASON GREEN
A significant part of the distribution of goods and services in
this country is going to move from conventional channels to some
sort of Internet system-whether it's retail goods or services.'
INTRODUCTION

The advent of the Internet' has revolutionized the global
marketplace.3 Traditional producers of goods and services and
. J.D. Candidate, The John Marshall Law School, June 2002. B.S. Civil
Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would like to
thank Annie Maron, Sonali Das, and the 2001-2002 Editorial Board for their
editorial assistance. I would like to thank my family for their support of my
academic endeavors, especially Amy Green for her incredible love and support.
1. Alan Greenspan, Address to Senate Budget Comm. (Jan. 28, 1999).
2. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D.
Penn. 1996), affd 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (defining the Internet as a "giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks"). Some networks are closed to other computer networks, but many
are connected to other networks allowing each computer in the network to
communicate with computers in other networks. Id. at 831. The world wide
web (or the "web") is the most well-known and advanced method of locating
and retrieving information on the Internet. Id. at 835-36. Any web document
can include links, formally known as "hyperlinks," to other types of information or resources. Id. at 836. "Such hyperlinks allow information to be accessed and organized in very flexible ways, and allow people to locate and efficiently view related information even if the information is stored on numerous
computers all around the world. Id.
3. See Thomas P. Vartanian, Whose Internet is it Anyway? The Law of
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Achieving Legal Order Among the World's
Nation's, at http://www.ffhsj.com/bancmail/jur-over.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2001) (arguing that the need for legal certainty in Internet-related
jurisdictional principles is a global issue). In fact, the defining feature of the
Internet is its transcendence of geographic borders. AM. BAR ASS'N, GLOBAL
CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION PROJECT 3 (2000). Consequently, the Internet's
global proliferation has been astounding; each minute, over five million e-mail
messages are being sent around the world. Id. at 3. In January 2001, there
were nearly twenty-five million web sites accessible on the web; as late as
1993, there were fifty-five million. Mark Memmott, A Different World Dawns
for Bush, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 19, 2001, at 4A.
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new Internet-based companies are transforming their business
processes into e-commerce 4 processes in an effort to lower costs,
improve customer service and increase productivity.' New competitors are enabled by the Internet's low cost, convenience, and
ubiquity, features which effectively eviscerate the traditionally
substantial barriers to market entry.' Before the Internet, companies utilized three channels of communication for exchanging information: person to person, written, and telephone.7 The Internet
combines and expands the capabilities of all three channels.8
The virtues of electronic commerce are certainly not limited to
the Fortune 500.' The Internet is the quintessential small and
middle-market business tool, because it provides access to the
global marketplace without having to go to the market. 0 Inversely, just as the entrepreneur reaches a global marketplace of
consumers, the consumer may choose from a global reach of sellers." The twenty-first century e-consumer maximizes his/her purchasing power, because such a consumer is
with near-armed

TODAY, Jan. 19, 2001, at 4A.
4. See OSCAR CHACON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
OVER THE INTERNET AND ITS EFFECT ON MARKET EFFICIENCY, SOCIOECONOMIC POLICY, RISK, CONTROL, AND AUDIT THEORY 2 (Montgomery Research, Se-Com Project No. 4.0, 1999) (defining e-commerce as "the sharing of
information, using a variety of electronic technologies, between organizations
and individuals for the purpose of doing business with one another"). There
remains much debate over whether a definitive definition of e-commerce exists. Id. Alternatively, e-commerce refers to the combination of business and
electronic infrastructures that enable online buying and selling of goods and
services. Id.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 1 (The Emerging Digital Economy 1, Chapter 1, 1999) (documenting
the proliferation of e-commerce and the dynamic changes it has accorded in
the global marketplace).
6. See Booz ALLEN & HAMILTON, INTERNET E-COMMERCE: DELIVERING
ON THE REAL PROMISE 1 (Montgomery Research, Se-Com Project No. 1.0,
1999) (assessing the relevant factors involved in implementing a fiscally responsible e-commerce strategy).
7. See FORRESTER RESEARCH, INC., E-COMMERCE TAKES OFF 1 (Montgomery Research, Se-Com Project No. 4.1, 1999) (stating that the Internet, as a
fundamentally new channel of communication, expands the capabilities of
both buyers and sellers). The Internet removes the telephone's time constraints, exceeds the depth of written communication, and provides the individual attention of a direct sales force, all while unlocking previously unreachable markets. Id.
8. Id.
9. See DEAN ANDAL, A UNIFORM JURISDICTIONAL STANDARD: APPLYING
SUBSTANTIAL PHYSICAL PRESENCE STANDARDS TO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 10
(1999) (stating that the Internet has its greatest effect on small and middlemarket businesses). Professor Andal theorizes that the more unique a product
or service, the more the Internet facilitates finding of market. Id.
10. Id.
11. See CHACON ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
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perfect market information.
This dynamic marketplace expansion triggered an imminent
effect, as the last ten years ushered the most profound economic
growth in United States' history. 13 Nevertheless, this astonishing
growth imparts a sphere of legal uncertainty when legal certainty
and stability are paramount to the future of e-commerce, because
legal certainty and stability are necessary to facilitate e-commerce
investment, development and entrepreneurship. Prospective entrepreneurs must know what laws apply in order to assess their
development patterns, price their products, and fully understand
their liabilities." Central to this inquiry is the question of personal jurisdiction."
This Comment explores the modern landscape for personal
jurisdiction due process standards in Internet litigation. Part I
traces personal jurisdiction from the ratification of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through the present and
develops the framework for personal jurisdiction in the modern
economic context. Part II analyzes various courts' application of
the minimum contacts standard in Internet litigation. Part III
proposes that the courts refine their current majority approach,
and adopt a "real space" analysis evaluating the outward manifest
purpose of the defendant's conduct with particular regard afforded
to the defendant's pecuniary expectancy interest in the forum
state.

I.

FROM PENNOYER TO ASAHI, DUE PROCESS STANDARDS FOR
JURISDICTIONAL AMENABILITY

Section A examines the concept of personal jurisdiction and
its correlative historical origins. Section B discusses the Supreme
Court's "minimum contacts" analysis established in International
Shoe v. Washington,8 and studies the residual effects of both the

12. Id. Facilitating consumer comparisons of product alternatives and
prices results in optimal purchasing decisions. Id. Economists refer to this as

Efficient Markets Theory. Id. The inevitable result is a downstream power
.shift from producer to consumer. Id. This increased opportunity for both consumers and small and middle market businesses helps even the playing field
between those who have capital and those who do not. Id.
13. Albert Gore, Foreword to TOWARDS DIGITAL EQUALITY 1, 1 (U.S. Gov't
Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 2nd Annual Report, 1999) (crediting

one third of real economic growth in the United States to the emergence of the
Internet).
14. Vartanian, supra note 3, at 5.
15. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(stating that personal jurisdiction, through the Due Process Clause, "gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where

that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit").
16. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Due Process Clause and the "minimum contacts" analysis. Section
C categorizes the general settings where a forum state may assert
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant without an actual
physical presence.
A. Pennoyer v. Neff and the TerritorialPersonalJurisdiction
Framework
Personal jurisdiction is defined as the power of a court over
the person of a defendant. 7 Specifically, personal jurisdiction
serves as a geographic or territorial limitation restricting where a
defendant may be sued."8 A court hearing a matter without the
requisite personal jurisdiction over the defendant is said to speak
"a nullity."" Essentially, without personal jurisdiction the final
judgment of the court harbors no legal significance.2' Thus, the establishment of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is fundamental to any cause of action.2 '
The traditional territorial notion of personal jurisdiction in
American jurisprudence is based on the power and presence
framework elucidated in Pennoyer v. Neff."
In Pennoyer, the
United States Supreme Court first applied the newly ratified,2
17.See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999) (defining personal jurisdiction as "a court's power to bring a person into its adjudicative process").
This type of jurisdiction is generally referred to as "in personam jurisdiction."
Id.
18. Russel D. Shurtz, WWW.InternationalShoe.Com: Analyzing Weber v.
Jolly Hotels' Paradigm For Personal Jurisdiction In Cyberspace, 1998
B.Y.U.L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1998) [hereinafter WWW.International Shoe.Com]
(citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) and McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957)).
19. See Vorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. 449, 467-68 (1836) (stating that "the
Court is prohibited from rendering judgment until certain pre-requisites have
been complied with, the judgment is not merely voidable, but a nullity, unless
these pre-requisites... appear to be performed").
20. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 529 (1953) (holding that a decree
issued in a state with no personal jurisdiction over the defendant will not be
afforded full faith and credit in another sovereign).
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring all claims for relief to set forth a
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends).
22. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). The court opined that there are two wellestablished, mutually exclusive principles respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over persons and property. Id. First, every state possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory. Id. Second, no state can exercise jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property exclusive of its territorial boundaries. Id. The states are
of equal dignity and authority, thus the independence of one necessarily implies the exclusion of power from all others. Id.
23. See generally U.S. CONST. (providing, as ratified in 1789, for full faith
and credit to judgments of all states, but not explicitly referring to personal
jurisdiction). Cf. Stephen Goldstein, Federalismand Substantive Due Process:
A Comparative and HistoricalPerspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969 (1995) (concluding that the reason any
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment14 as a limitation on a state's exertion of personal jurisdiction. 25 As a general
rule, according to the "power and presence" framework established
in Pennoyer, a court's personal jurisdiction over a given defendant
arises when the defendant is domiciled in the forum state.6 This
notion of territorial jurisdiction is generally intuitive to the average American: a citizen of Maine would never expect to defend a
lawsuit in Hawaii without any prior connection to Hawaii. 7 However, since the age of Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has struggled
to adapt the limitations of Pennoyer and the Due Process Clause to
the increased mobility of society and the subsequent globalization
of commerce. 8
B. International Shoe v. Washington and the Modern Economic
Landscape
By the mid-twentieth century, the proliferation of interstate
travel and communication rendered the rigidity of the Pennoyer
standard substantially impracticable. 9 The rule became laden

reference to personal jurisdiction in the United States Constitution was omitted was that the rules of personal jurisdiction in the common law world appeared so clear, and so well accepted at the end of the eighteenth century, that
harmonization at the federal level was deemed unnecessary).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV. § 1 (providing in pertinent part, "[n]o
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
[s]tate shall
process of law . . .").
25. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. Pennoyer involved a collateral attack by Neff,
a resident of California, who was challenging the legitimacy of a sheriffs sale
instituted to satisfy a default judgment issued by an Oregon court. Id. at 71517. Neff asserted that the Oregon court lacked personal jurisdiction. Id. The
District Court of Oregon invalidated the judgment on unrelated grounds, but
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the Oregon court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Neff. Id. In an epic opinion, Justice Field
proffered an all-or-nothing standard by which a state has unquestionable jurisdictional authority over persons within its territory and no jurisdictional
authority over persons exclusive of its territory. Id. at 733-36. See generally
Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdictionand Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH L. REV. 479 (1987) (providing a thorough examination of the facts, characters, and enduring effects of
Pennoyer).
26. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1973) (defining domicile as
"an individual's true, fixed, and permanent home and place of habitation").
27. See Shurtz, supra note 18, at 1666 (stating that a citizen happily residing in one state justly would be disturbed to learn that he was being "haled"
into a court in another state if he had no prior contact with the other state).
This would be neither fair nor reasonable. Id.
28. See generally ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 2.02
(2d ed. 1990); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for PersonalJurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984).
29. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714 (holding that in-state service of process
was a prerequisite to the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
See also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (stating that
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with illogical exceptions. 30 As a matter of consistency, it became
exceedingly apparent that developing a new, pragmatic constitutional standard was both imperative and reasonable."
Therefore, in 1945, the Supreme Court addressed the rigidity
of the Pennoyer standard in the seminal case of InternationalShoe
v. Washington.2 The International Shoe analysis focused the jurisdictional inquiry on the contacts between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.33 The Court held that, in order to satisfy
due process, a state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant unless there are "certain minimum contacts
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."34
While the Court did not expound what contacts would be deemed
sufficient, it suggested that whether jurisdiction is permissible depends on the "quality and nature" of the contacts with the forum

with the declining burdens imposed by interstate travel, and the expansion of
national marketing and commercialization, the states were prevented from
adequately protecting their respective interests).
30. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (holding that an in
personam judgment may be rendered in a cross-action against a plaintiff who
has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by bringing the suit);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438-49 (1932) (holding that service of
process on a United States citizen in a foreign country does not violate due
process); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916) (holding that nonresident motorist statutes that equate the use of a state's highways with a defendant's consent to appear are constitutional).
31. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23 stating that:
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions
touch two or more states and may involve parties separated by the full
continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come
an increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state
lines.
Id. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it
less burdensome for a party sued to defend itself in a state where it engages in
economic activity"). Id.
32. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945). The International
Shoe Company, incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Missouri, employed between eleven and thirteen people in the State of Washington between
1937 and 1940, despite maintaining neither an office nor merchandise storage
facilities in the state. Id. at 313-14. The State of Washington filed suit in its
own courts asserting that International Shoe was in default on unpaid unemployment compensation funds. Id. at 313. The United States Supreme Court
upheld the State of Washington's assertion of jurisdiction stating that due
process is served after assessing the "quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws" of the forum. Id. at
319. "[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state ... the privilege may give rise to obligations," which,
for example, may require the corporation to defend against a suit. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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state." The rationale of the InternationalShoe Court implies that
a corporation (or individual) choosing to conduct activities within a
state implicitly accepts a reciprocal duty to defend suits, arising
out of those activities, in the local courts.36 The defendant who deliberately chooses to take advantage of "the benefits and protections of the laws" 3 7 of a state should not be surprised when that
state holds that defendant accountable in its court for those instate acts.38
The fundamental obstacle in applying the minimum contacts
standard is defining the "quality and nature" that makes a contact
sufficient to support jurisdiction.39 The Supreme Court's majority
position is to apply the reasoning in Hanson v. Denckla. ° In Hanson, the Supreme Court held that "an act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum [sitate, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws," is always necessary.4 1
The reconciled residual effect of the holdings in International
Shoe and Hanson is a variation in defining the due process requirements.42 Now, "minimum contacts" is more logically equated
with the Hanson requirement that the defendant purposefully
avail himself/herself of the forum state's benefits.43 International
Shoe's "fair and orderly administration of the laws" is now said to

35. Id. at 319.
36. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 4, (3rd ed. 1990) (stating that a defendant should understand

that his or her activities within a state will have an inherent impact upon citizens and entities within that state). Professor Glannon observes that a state
has a cognizable interest in enforcing an orderly conduct of affairs and adjudicating any disputes that may arise out of those activities. Id.
37. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
38. GLANNON, supra note 36, at 4.
39. Id. at 8.
40. 357 U.S. 235, 265 (1958). In Hanson, the parties contested trust assets
that were located in the State of Delaware. Id. at 238. A group of claimants
brought an action in Florida state court seeking dispensation of the trust assets they claimed were passed under the residuary clause of a will. Id. The
United States Supreme Court held that the fact that the owner was domiciled
in Florida was an insufficient basis to establish jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee. Id. Because Florida was forbidden to enter a judgment binding a
person over whom it had no jurisdiction, it had even less right to enter a
judgment purporting to extinguish the interest of such a person in property
over which it had no jurisdiction. Id. at 255-56.
41. Id. at 253. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 3, at 41 (stating that "such
an act may be a single occurrence, such as performing a single service in the
state; it may be continuous presence of the defendant in the state as a citizen
or domiciliary; it may be [and frequently is] something in between"). Any time
a defendant is physically, intentionally present within the forum, the defendant has unequivocally benefited from the legal protections of that forum. Id.
42. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 3, at 41.
43. Id.
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require that the assertion of jurisdiction be "reasonable.""
This hybrid analysis has led to universal application of a
three-prong test to determine whether a nonresident has sufficient
contacts with the forum state, such that the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' First, the court considers whether
the defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the
forum state. 6 Second, the court resolves whether the claim asserted against the defendant arose out of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state. 7 And third, the court determines whether
the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 8 This three-pronged test
provides the current constitutional framework for "real space" jurisdictional analysis.
However, cases arising in the context of Internet commerce
and communication do not generally fit within the most basic concepts of the paradigm established by International Shoe and its
progeny. 9 In the Internet landscape, a defendant's "presence" may
be manifested merely by a web site accessible in the forum."0 In
fact, the defendant may never be physically present in the forum
state.
C. PersonalJurisdictionWithout Physical Presence
The United States Supreme Court has held that personal jurisdiction, with no physical presence, is constitutionally permissible in three different settings. 1 First, jurisdiction can be constitu44. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105
(1987)).
45. Darby v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 769 F. Supp. 1255, 1262
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

46. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. The critical inquiry is whether those activities are such that the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,

297 (1980).
47. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).
48. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. Implicit in this empha-

sis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant
will be considered in light of other factors. Id. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (considering the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)
(considering plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, especially when that interest is not adequately protected by plaintiffs choice of
forum); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, n. 37 (1977) (considering the interstate judicial system's interest in effectuating the most efficacious resolution of controversies); see also Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93 (considering the shared
interests of the several states in advancing fundamental substantive social
policies).
49. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 3, at 43.

50. Id.
51. Id. The American Bar Association argues that prior case law has dealt
with variations of the same problem, a defendant not physically present in the
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tionally permissible when the defendant, through a purposeful act
or availment, receives some indirect economic benefit.52 This doctrine is most commonly referred to as the "stream of commerce"
doctrine. The doctrine originated in the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 3 The
court held that an Ohio manufacturer was subject to personal juThe court opined, "to the extent that its
risdiction in Illinois.'
business may be directly affected by transactions occurring here it
5
enjoys benefits from the laws of this state."
The Gray court acknowledged the substantial logistic developments of the modern economic world, eradicating the significance of state lines in both distribution and communication.56 The
impact of the Gray holding was momentous: a business whose
product was "swept" into another state through the channels of
commerce was subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the United
forum state. Id. This prior case law avails relevant precedent to guide the
emerging jurisprudence. Id.
52. Id.
53. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 763
(1961).
54. Id. at 444. The plaintiff brought a personal injury suit against several
defendants alleging that a water heater exploded as a proximate result of a
negligently constructed safety valve. Id. at 434. The defendant, Titan Valve
Manufacturing Company, was a foreign corporation based in Cleveland, Ohio,
with no physical presence in Illinois. Id. Titan Valve filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that it had not committed a tortious act in Illinois. Id. Its affidavit stated that it did no business in Illinois and that it sold the completed
valves to a co-defendant outside Illinois. Id. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant had sufficient contacts with the State of
Illinois to establish jurisdiction because Titan elected to sell its product for ultimate use in Illinois. Id. at 444.
55. Id. at 442. Justice Klingbiel stated:
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other [sitates. The fact that the
benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does not
make it any the less essential to the conduct of his business; [thus] it is
not unreasonable ... to say that the use of such products in the ordinary
course of commerce is sufficient contact with this [s]tate to justify a requirement that he defend here. As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another [s]tate, it is not
unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in
those products.

Id.
56. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 767. Justice Klingbiel acknowledged the changing
nature of the modern market: "[aidvanced means of distribution and other
commercial activity have ... largely effaced the economic significance of
[s]tate lines. By the same token, today's facilities for transportation and communication have removed much of the difficulty and inconvenience formerly
encountered in defending lawsuits brought in other [s]tates." Id. at 442-43.
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States Supreme Court validated the constitutionality of the
"stream of commerce" doctrine,57 but would not allow jurisdiction
upon the specific facts of that case.5 8 In that opinion, Justice
White issued a calamitous warning against the expansive use of
the doctrine opining that:
it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.
Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states. 9

57. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). In
validating the "stream of commerce" argument, Justice White, citing Gray,
stated:
When a corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [sitate,' it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers,
or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the [s]tate.
Hence if the sale of a product ...is not simply an isolated occurrence,
but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other [s]tates, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those [s]tates ...The forum
[s]tate does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum [sitate.
Id. at 297-98 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 265 (1958)).
58. Id. at 299. A New York resident purchased a car from World-Wide
Volkswagen in New York. Id. at 286. While driving through Oklahoma, the
car was struck from the rear, igniting a fire that severely injured the purchaser. Id. The purchaser filed a products liability action in Oklahoma. Id. at
299. The defendants asserted that Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction would
offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The trial
court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the defendants' claim, but
the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding no specific
factual basis establishing any "contacts, ties, or relations" with the State of
Oklahoma. Id. at 298.
59. Id. at 294. Justice White warned:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
the [s]tates, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a
similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less
burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of
Pennoyer, to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe. But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of
the respective [sitates.
Id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) and Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). But see Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03, n. 10, (1982) (stating that although
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Cognizant of Justice White's concerns in World Wide Volkswagen, the Court has materially limited the breadth of jurisdiction
possible through the "stream of commerce" doctrine.6" In Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,the Court held
that a defendant must engage in "something more" than just placing the product in the stream of commerce to render personal jurisdiction constitutionally permissible."1 Thus, the "mere forseeability" that a product will be "swept" into the forum state is
insufficient to sustain jurisdiction, unless the defendant acts with
"purposeful intent.., to serve the forum."62
Second, personal jurisdiction is permissible when the defendant intentionally causes damage in the forum state.63 The seminal case employing this doctrine, which is commonly called the "effects test", is Calder v. Jones. 4 In Calder, the Supreme Court held

this protection operates to restrict state power, it "must be seen as ultimately
a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause" rather than as a function "of federalism concerns").
60. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1986).
The defendant, Asahi Metal, a Japanese corporation, manufactured a valve
that was sold to defendant Cheng Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese corporation, who
used it in manufacturing a motorcycle tire. Id. at 106. The tire exploded in
California, and the driver filed a products liability claim against Cheng Shin
Rubber, who filed a cross-complaint for indemnity against Asahi Metal. Id. at
105-106. The trial court denied Asahi Metal's motion to quash service, the
California Court of Appeals reversed, and the California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. Id. at 107-108. The United States
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the mere fact that Asahi
Metal knew that its parts would be used in products sold in the state did not
provide the minimum contacts for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction
over it, because Asahi did not avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in the state. Id. at 112-13. Justice O'Connor, wrote that "mere awareness" does not establish minimum contacts sufficient to render a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with fair play and substantial justice as
required by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 113-14. The Court stated that:
The substantial connection between the defendant and the forum necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must derive from an action purposely directed toward the forum state, and the mere placement of a
product into the stream of commerce is not such an act, even if done
with awareness that the stream will sweep the product into the forum
state absent additional conduct indicating an intent to serve the forum.
Id. at 112.
61. Id. at 111.
62. Id.
63. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 3, at 48-49.
64. 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1983). Jones, a California resident, brought an action in California against a national magazine based in Florida alleging libel.
Id. at 784. The defendants moved to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, but the California
appellate court reversed and was affirmed by the California Supreme Court.
Id. at 785. The United States Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was
proper, on the basis of the effects of the defendant's intentional conduct while
in Florida. Id. at 789.
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that actions intending to and causing damage in the forum state
subjects the defendant to personal jurisdiction in that state.65 The
applicability of the "effects test" is fairly narrow; typically, courts
only apply the doctrine to intellectual property and intentional tort
claims.6
Third, jurisdiction is permissible when the defendant has intentionally affiliated himself/herself with some entity in the forum,
where that affiliation is sufficient to satisfy the requirements
evinced in Hanson.7 The best example of such intentional affiliation is in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 6 8 In Burger King, the

Supreme Court held that when a foreign defendant intentionally
affiliates himself/herself with an entity in the forum state, jurisdiction might constitutionally be asserted if the affiliation is of the
"nature and quality" expounded in Hanson.69 The Court specifically rejected any "talismanic jurisdictional formula," noting that
its decision did not justify an assertion of personal jurisdiction
over any party within contractual privity of a contract in the other
party's home state. 0

65. Id. Justice Rehnquist held that "[tihe allegedly libelous story concerned
the California activities of a California resident ...the article was drawn from
California sources, the brunt of the harm, in terms of both the plaintiffs emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in
California." Id. at 788-89. "California is the focal point both of the story and
the harm suffered. Id. at 789. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper
in California based on the 'effects' of the Florida conduct in California." Id.
(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980)).
66. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 3, at 49.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 and 46.
68. 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1962). Burger King, a Florida corporation with its
principal offices located in Miami, filed a breach of contract action against two
Michigan residents operating a franchise in Michigan. Id. at 462. The parties
had previously executed a franchise agreement under which the defendant
was licensed to use Burger King's trade and service marks in a leased standardized restaurant facility for a period of twenty years. Id. Subsequently,
when the restaurant's patronage declined, the defendants fell behind in their
monthly payments. Id. After extended negotiations among the parties proved
unsuccessful in solving the problem, the Miami headquarters terminated the
agreement, ordered the defendants to vacate the premises, and brought a
breach of contract action. Id. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming that, because they were Michigan residents and Burger King's claim did
not "arise" within Florida, they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Florida. Id. After numerous appeals, the United States Supreme Court determined that a party that avails itself of the benefits and protections of the
law of a forum state is subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. Id. at 487.
The Court found that the defendants had entered into a contract and established a substantial and continuing relationship with the plaintiff, a Florida
resident. Id. at 479. Furthermore, the defendant had fair notice that he
might be subject to suit in Florida. Id. at 487.
69. Id. at 474-75.
70. Id. at 485.
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Essentially, the Burger King Court, like the Calder and Asahi
Courts after it, centered the jurisdictional inquiry on the purposeful conduct of the defendant.7' This inquiry invokes an element of
fundamental fairness by allowing the defendant to structure his or
her conduct to alleviate the burden of unexpected, distant litigation and provide minimum assurance of potential amenability.
Establishing the constitutional standards for personal jurisdiction in Internet litigation requires an exhaustive understanding
of the due process framework. The preceding three situations
serve as examples for exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants with no physical presence in the forum. In all three situations, the United States Supreme Court required that the defenstate.1
dant engage in conduct purposefully directed at the forum
This concurrent requirement provides a framework for the analysis of current Internet personal jurisdiction disputes.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN INTERNET LITIGATION

Section A examines the initial application of due process
standards to the Internet framework. Section B introduces the
passive/interactive distinction and discusses the sliding scale
analysis elucidated in Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com.73
Section C surveys courts' current proclivity toward a more traditional application of the purposeful availment standard.
A. Primitive Due Process in a Primitive Cyber World
The first Internet-based jurisdiction cases presented a legal
issue without precedent. Traditional notions of due process did
not comport with the Internet paradigm, because a territorialbased doctrine is inherently irreconcilable in a medium that defies
geographic boundaries.74 Rather than defining a new jurisdictional
framework, however, contemporary courts applied well-known
tenets of personal jurisdiction to answer due process questions.
The first major case to address the sufficiency of a web site in
establishing minimum contacts was Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruc71. Id. at 462. See also text accompanying notes 60 and 65. The common
thread indicative of the non-physical presence cases is the Court's focus on the
purpose or intent of the defendant's conduct.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 60, 65, and 68.
73. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
74. Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Rejects Sliding Scale Approach To Finding
Personal Jurisdiction Based On Internet Contacts - GTE New Media Servs.
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000), 113 HARV. L. REV.
2128, 2128 (2000) [hereinafter CircuitRejects Sliding Scale Approach] (asserting that courts have struggled to apply a territorial-based doctrine to a medium that defies geographic boundaries).
75. Edmund M. Amorosi, Federal Courts Adapt PersonalJurisdictionLaw
For Disputes on Internet, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 21, 2000, at 2.
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tion Set, Inc. 6 In that case, Inset Systems, a Connecticut corporation, filed a trademark infringement action against Instruction
Set, a Massachusetts corporation, in a Connecticut District
Court.77 Instruction Set filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
citing a lack of personal jurisdiction.7 ' The court denied the motion, holding the minimum contacts necessary to comport with due
process were satisfied because the defendant had engaged a ubiquitously accessible web site, as well 7as
9 a toll-free number to solicit
business in the State of Connecticut.
The court reasoned that the Internet, by its very nature, is
designed to transmit information worldwide. ° As such, Instruction Set had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in the State of Connecticut, and therefore, should reasonably anticipate the possibility of defending suit there. 81
The precedential effect rendered by the Inset Systems holding
is chilling." Using the Inset System court's rationale, by establishing a web site, every host in the country renders himself amenable
to jurisdiction in every state for claims arising out of his site.83
76. 937 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D.Conn. 1996).
77. Id. Inset filed and received registration as the owner of the federal
trademark "INSET" in October 1986. Id. at 163. Thereafter, Instruction Set
obtained "INSET.COM" as its Internet domain address. Id.
78. Id. at 162. The defendant also asserted that venue was improper. Id.
at 165.
79. Id. at 164. The court reasoned that Instruction Set, through the use of
the Internet and a toll-free number, had directed its advertising efforts towards the entire country. Id. at 165. In fact, the court reasoned, the mere
readiness to initiate solicitation of Connecticut residents constitutes the purposeful availment of doing business in Connecticut. Id. (citing Whelen Eng'g
Co., Inc. v. Tomar Elecs., 672 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.Conn. 1993)).
80. Id. at 165. "Once posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio
advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any [and every]
Internet user." Id.
81. Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165. The court cited Connecticut's interest in adjudicating a dispute concerning state statutory and common law and
the minimal distance between Connecticut and Massachusetts. Id.
82. Michael E. Allen, Note, Analyzing Minimum Contacts Through the
Internet: Should the World Wide Web Mean World Wide Jurisdiction,31 IND.
L. REV. 385, 402 (1998).
83. Id. See also Maritz v. CyberGold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (holding that a California corporation's web site, which provided information about the company's mailing list, was a conscious decision to transmit advertising information to all Internet users). The court found that the
defendant's contacts were "of such a quality and nature, albeit a very new
quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence." Id. at 1333. The
Maritz court contrasted the automatic exchange of information on CyberGold's
web site with the discretionary response to customer's request for information
through the mail. Id. The manifest implication of the court in both Maritz
and Inset Systems is that "because material is accessible universally, jurisdiction might [be constitutionally permissible] almost anywhere." Corey Ackerman, Note, World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet the World Wide Web: An Examination of Personal JurisdictionApplied to a New World, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
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This reasoning assails the very essence of due process and fails to
heed the calamitous warning of Justice White in World-Wide
Volkswagen.' Thus, after World-Wide Volkswagen, courts have
explicitly rejected the Inset Systems holding and rationale.85
In CompuServe v. Patterson, CompuServe, an Ohio-based
Internet service provider, brought an action in an Ohio district
court seeking declaratory judgment that it was not infringing on
Patterson's trademarks.8 6 Patterson had entered into a "Shareware
Registration Agreement" with CompuServe in 1991, allowing him
to place "shareware" on the CompuServe system for others to purchase. 87 From 1991 to 1994, Patterson, from his Texas home,
transmitted thirty-two independent software files to CompuServe's
Ohio system, where they were displayed and available to all
CompuServe subscribers.8 During that time period, CompuServe
began to market an Internet navigation system similar to the defendant's.89
The district court granted Patterson's motion to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction, ° but the United States Court of Ap-

403, 432 n.136 (1997).
84. Ackerman, supra note 83, at 432 n.137. See also supra text accompanying note 59 (quoting Justice White arguing that the Court's proclivity towards
a more flexible constitutional standard should not signal the eventual demise
of restrictions on the exertion of personal jurisdiction by state courts).
85. See Millennium Enter., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d.
907, 915 (D. Or. 1999) (concluding that courts have shifted away from finding
jurisdiction based solely on the existence of web site advertising). The court
referred to the Inset Systems holding as an "inauspicious beginning" to Internet minimum contacts questions. Id.
86. 89 F.3d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir. 1996). Defendant Richard Patterson, a
Texas resident, subscribed to CompuServe for his Internet service. Id. at
1260.
87. Id. The "Shareware Registration Agreement" permitted Patterson to
sell his shareware to any CompuServe subscriber. Id.
88. Id. at 1261. Patterson advertised and sold his software exclusively on
CompuServe's system. Id. However, over this period of time, Patterson asserted that he sold less than $650 worth of software to twelve Ohio residents.
Id.
89. Id. Patterson's software allowed Internet users to navigate the web.
Id. Patterson notified CompuServe's marketing department that its product
infringed his common law trademarks and demanded $100,000 to release
CompuServe from any potential claims. Id. CompuServe filed a declaratory
judgment action in the federal district court for the Southern District Court of
Ohio. Id.
90. CompuServe Inc., 89 F.3d at 1261. The district court held that the relationship was marked by a "minimal course of dealing" and looked to "cases involving interstate business negotiations and relationships." Id. at 1264. See
also Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that the contacts between an England-based association and an
Ohio plaintiff were "superficial" where the parties had engaged in mail and
telephone communications, but had engaged in no prior negotiations and had
no expectation of future consequences).
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peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Patterson
"knowingly made an effort-and in fact, purposefully contracted-to
market a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe
operating, in effect, as his distribution center."'"
The impact of the CompuServe decision is principally in what
the court did not decide. The court refused to rule on whether Patterson would be subject to suit in any state where his software was
used.92 Thus, the CompuServe court impliedly rejected the reasoning of Inset Systems, by suggesting that Patterson might not be
subject to jurisdiction in every state where his software was sold or
used.93 This was a significant departure from the reasoning of Inset Systems, and fashioned the need for a new standard for analy• 94
sis.

B. The Passive/InteractiveDistinctionand the Sliding Scale

91. CompuServe Inc., 89 F.3d at 1263. The court found that Patterson
clearly engaged in purposeful conduct creating a substantial connection with
the State of Ohio:
[When] Patterson chose to transmit his software from Texas to CompuServe's system in Ohio, myriad others gained access to Patterson's software via that system, and Patterson advertised and sold his product
through that system ....

Moreover, this was a relationship intended to

be on going in nature; it was not a 'one-shot affair'. . . we believe that
ample contacts exist.
Id. at 1264-65.
92. Id. at 1268. The court explicitly stated:
We need not and do not hold that Patterson would be subject to suit in
any state where his software was purchased or used; that is not the issue before us. We also do not have before us an attempt by another
party from a third state to sue Patterson in Ohio for, say, a "computer
virus" caused by his software, and thus we need not address whether
personal jurisdiction could be found on those facts. Finally, we need not
and do not hold that CompuServe may, as the district court posited, sue
any regular subscriber to its service for nonpayment in Ohio, even if the
subscriber to its service is a native Alaskan who has never left home.
Id.
93. Compare Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 162 (implying that a web host
would be subject to personal jurisdiction in every state), with CompuServe
Inc., 89 F.3d at 1259 (refusing to extend their holding beyond the facts of that
case). Applying the rationale of the Inset Systems court to CompuServe, Inc.
would clearly render Patterson subject to the personal jurisdiction of every
state where his software was sold or used.
94. While the residual effect of the Inset Systems holding was chilling, it
unquestionably provided both legal stability and certainty. Essentially, every
web host was subject to the jurisdiction of every state. The CompuServe, Inc.
court opened the door of uncertainty. Thus, to avoid any "talismanic jurisdictional formula," a new standard was necessary. See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 (1962) (stating that the facts of each case
must always be weighed to determine whether jurisdiction would comport
with fair play and substantial justice). Any jurisdictional determination that
prevents the defendant from a reasonable anticipation of being brought before
a court does not comport with these notions. Id. at 486.
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Standardof Zippo ,
Several courts have elucidated a dispositive distinction between passive and interactive web sites.9" The distinction is firmly
rooted in Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce" analysis.96 The
implication is that hosting a web site is substantially similar to
placing a product in the stream of commerce. 97 In both circumstances, the defendant chose a course of action in which the effect
in the forum state is reasonably foreseeable. 9 However, without
requiring "something more," the defendant would essentially be
subject to nationwide jurisdiction.99 A contrary due process standard would effectively eviscerate any rational limits on state sovereignty. 0
In Benusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,' the plaintiff corporation, owner of a famous New York jazz club known as "The Blue
Note," brought a trademark infringement action against the defendant, the owner of a jazz club in Missouri operating under the
same name.1°2 In April 1996, King created a general access web
site promoting his club' 2 and containing a logo substantially similar to the logo utilized by the plaintiff.' The defendant filed a mo95. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that a review of prior cases revealed that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised if directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial interactivity available
over the web site).
96. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
See also Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1362-65 (W.D.
Ark. 1997) (finding the "stream of commerce" doctrine analogous to web site
advertising).
97. Id. Both creating a web site and placing a product in the stream of
commerce have nationwide effects, however without something more, these
acts are not purposefully directed at the forum state. Id.
98. Compare Benusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300 (concluding that the defendant

could have foreseen that his web site was available to forum residents) with
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (assuming that Asahi was aware that its valves would
be incorporated into tires sold in the forum state).
99. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 102 (introducing the
"something more" standard), with Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (finding
limitless jurisdictional boundaries).
100. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (holding that merely hosting a

web site with a commercial advertisement is a purposeful availment of doing
business in every state).
101. 937 F. Supp. at 295, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. Id. at 297.
103. Id. The web site contained general information about the club, including a calendar of events and the name, address, and local phone number for a
ticket outlet in Columbia, Missouri. Id.
104. Id. In addition, the defendant's web site contained the following disclaimer: "The Blue Note's Cyberspot should not be confused with one of the
world's finest jazz club[s] [the] Blue Note located in the heart of New York's

Greenwich Village." Id. at 297-98. The site also contained a hyperlink to the

1068

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:1051

tion to dismiss citing a lack of personal jurisdiction. 5
The court dismissed the case holding that the defendant was
not amenable to suit under either the New York long-arm statute
or the Due Process Clause.' 6 King had done nothing to purposefully avail himself of New York;"°7 he was neither seeking to encourage New Yorkers to access his site nor visit his club.1 08 In fact,
the court opined, his actions were analogous to merely placing a
product into the stream of commerce.10 9 Thus by analogy, merely
creating a web site, without something more, is an insufficient basis to establish jurisdiction. This analysis comports with the rationale of Asahi and maintains the court's focus on the defendant's
purposeful conduct.
Shifting this reasoning to the Internet context, the "something more" requirement of Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce" opinion appears to be inherently possible through the medium itself."' The critical inquiry would be the level of commercial
interactivity available directly through the site.' In Benusan, the
court noted that Internet users could not order tickets directly
from the defendant's web site."12 The manifest implication is that
if the site allows New Yorkers to buy tickets while accessing the
web site, the defendant purposefully avails himself/herself of the
benefits of conducting business in New York. Thus, the defendant
satisfied the
"something more" requirement in Justice O'Connor's
13
analysis.
However, the next step in this emerging jurisprudence illogically obfuscated the court's focus on the defendant's conduct. In
plaintiffs web site, which could be accessed by double-clicking on the hyperlink. Id. at 298.
105. Id.
106. Benusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300. The court's constitutional inquiry was
unnecessary, and as such, is actually dicta. The Due Process Clause functions
as a limit to a state's sovereignty over a non-resident defendant when that de-

fendant is subject to a forum state's jurisdiction under the state's long-arm
statute. Id. However, the Bensusan court determined that King was not sub-

ject to New York's jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute. Id.
107. Id. at 301.
108. Id.
109. Id. "Creating a [web] site, like a placing a product into the stream of
commerce, may be felt nationwide, or even worldwide, but, without more, it is

not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1986) (holding that merely placing
a product into the stream of commerce, without something more is not an act
sufficient to support jurisdiction).
110. See Allen, supra note 82, at 403 (arguing that the "stream of commerce"

analysis is fundamentally different in the Internet context). In the Internet
context, the "something more" requirement could be established by some characteristic of the web site itself. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 402 (citing Bensusan, 937 F. Supp at 299).

113. Id.
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Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Corn, the court further defined
the passive/interactive distinction and created a sliding scale of interactivity to analyze cases where the defendant's web site is not
In that case, the plaintiff,
definitively passive or interactive.'
Zippo Manufacturing, filed a trademark dilution and infringement
action in Pennsylvania district court against Zippo Dot Com, a
California Internet news service." 5 The defendant's only contacts
with Pennsylvania residents occurred over the Internet, and approximately two percent of the defendant's 140,000 worldwide
subscribers were Pennsylvania residents."' In addition. Dot Com
had entered into agreements with seven Pennsylvania-based
Internet service providers.'17
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion holding that Dot
Com's Pennsylvania contacts were sufficient to establish jurisdiction." ' The court specifically rejected Dot Corn's contention 9 that
its contacts with Pennsylvania residents were "fortuitous" within
the meaning of World Wide Volkswagen."'
Instead, the court adopted a sliding scale of interactivity to
analyze the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised. 2 ' In the sliding scale analysis, an interactive,
substantially commercial web site, with repeated file transmissions will likely establish constitutionally permissible jurisdiction.
Conversely, an informational, passive web site is not

114. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
115. Id. at 1121. Zippo Dot Com's web site contained information about the
company and a subscription application. Id. The user provided vital information and proffered payment either by credit card directly through the web site
or over the telephone. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1127. The court noted that Zippo Dot Corn had "done more" than
just create an interactive web site. Id. at 1125. It contracted with 3,000 residents and seven Internet service providers in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1126.
119. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126. "Dot Com repeatedly and consciously
chose to process Pennsylvania resident's applications and to assign them
passwords." Id. "When a defendant makes a conscious choice to conduct business with the residents of a forum state, 'it has clear notice that it is subject to
suit there."' Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1979)). "Dot Corn was under no obligation to sell its services to
Pennsylvania residents. It freely chose to do so, presumably in order to profit
from those transactions." Id. "If Dot Corn had not wanted to be amenable to
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have been simple, it could
have chosen not to sell its services to Pennsylvania residents." Id. at 1126-27.
120. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (stating that jurisdiction can not be based upon one, isolated occurrence which was merely foreseeable to the defendant).
121. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
122. Id. at 1124. The court opined:
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grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction. 12 The middle ground
is occupied by interactive web sites where a user can exchange information with the host site.1 14 In these cases the material inquiry
is the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of that activity.,
However, this analysis, much like Justice O'Connor's "stream
of commerce" analysis, offers wide discretion to the court. Undeniably, a majority of web sites are neither entirely passive in nature, nor substantially commercial in nature.12 Thus, the sliding
scale analysis, on its face, fails its essential purpose.127 An entrepreneur has very little guidance in structuring his/her conduct, or
[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is
consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one
end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper.
Id. at 1124. E.g. CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
123. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. The court proffered:
At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted
information on an Internet web site that is accessible to users in foreign
jurisdictions. A passive web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Id. E.g. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 295, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
124. E.g. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (holding
that a California corporation's web site, which provided information about the
company's mailing list, was a conscious decision to transmit advertising information to all Internet users) (E.D. Mo. 1996); Ty. Inc. v. Clark, No.
99C5532, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 383 at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2000) (finding
that the defendant's web site received e-mail and issued ordering information
fell in the "middle ground"); Origin Instruments Corp. v. Adaptive Computer
Sys., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2595-L, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1451, at *8 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 4, 1999) (holding that the defendant's site, which provided product information and a hyperlink to another web site that sold the products was in the
"middle ground" according to Zippo).
125. See cases cited supra note 124 (finding that the level of interactivity and
the "quality and nature" of that activity is the determinative factor in evaluating the defendant's contacts).
126. See cases cited and text accompanying supra note 124 (showing that the
majority of web sites will fall into this pervasive "middle ground").
127. See Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV.
925, 939 (1998) (concluding that the current "hodgepodge" of cases which fall
in this middle ground is "inconsistent, irrational, and irreconcilable"). This is
in direct conflict with an essential element of Due Process Clause protection
because it fails to give a degree of predictability to a legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them amenable to
suit. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1979).
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web site, in a way that adequately assesses his/her potential amenability to suit in a foreign state.
With this in mind, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia recently rejected this sliding scale analysis
for the very reasons cited above. 128 This decision seems to indicate
greater reliance on traditional "real space" analysis in evaluating
Internet contacts.
C. A TraditionalApplication of the PurposefulAvailment
Standard
Recently, several courts have indicated a proclivity to take a
more traditional "real-space" view of the purposeful availment requirement. 9 In GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,
GTE filed an action against five regional Bell operating companies
alleging antitrust violations and tortious interference with a contract. '30 GTE asserted that the alleged conspiracy was designed to
cause Internet users to use only defendants' links, which, as a result of the increased number of hits to each site, increased advertising revenue. 31 The defendants moved the district court to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, but were denied. 32'
The district court applied the sliding scale test established in
Zippo to categorize the defendants' Internet contacts.'33
The D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding there was sufficient evidence to sustain personal jurisdiction.'
128. GTE Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1346 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
129. See GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1346
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (concentrating the court's inquiry on the purposeful acts specifically directed at the forum); Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music,
Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921 (D. Or. 1999) (finding that reliance on the sliding
scale of web site interactivity is insufficient for a conclusive finding ofjurisdiction).
130. GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1346. GTE had a non-exclusive
contract with Netscape, pursuant to which Netscape offered several Internet
business directories on its site, including GTE's SuperPages. Id. GTE alleged
that the five regional Bell companies conspired to monopolize the Internet
business directories market, offering a joint, mutually exclusive map whereby
each company provided exclusive service for its region. Id.
131. Id. at 1345. Large search engines and other large general use web sites
generate revenue from the advertising placed on their sites. Id. The rate of
compensation is calculated much like a television or radio commercial. Instead of Nielsen ratings to gauge the attractiveness to the advertiser, web
hosts compute the number of people who visit the site or "hits". Therefore,
even a web site that is free to the user, with no "commercial interactivity," can
generate substantial revenue for the host. Id.
132. Id. at 1346. The district court held that the defendants had engaged in
"a persistent course of conduct" under the D.C. long-arm statute. Id. at 1349.
133. Id. The web sites were deemed to be "highly interactive" with district
users and highly commercial in both quality and nature. Id.

134. GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1349.
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As such, the court rejected the reasoning of Zippo. The court concluded that the passive/interactive distinction fails, because the
fundamental purpose of personal jurisdiction due process is to allow the defendant an opportunity to effectively structure his or her
conduct and control where the defendant might be amenable to legal action.'
The court found that the district court failed to justify why interactivity should serve as a proxy for minimum contacts or why maintaining a highly interactive web site should
independently give rise to jurisdiction. 3 ' The district court's
analysis, applying the Zippo standard, did not serve as an effective
means for evaluating the nature of the defendants' contacts.'37
Another recent case applied a similar line of reasoning, and
rejected the Zippo analysis. In Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v.
Millennium Music, LP, the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon held that the middle interactive category of
Zippo needed further refinement to include the fundamental requirement of personal jurisdiction: "deliberate action."'3 " Thus, the
court held, the "something more" requirement of Justice
O'Connor's analysis would not be satisfied through an interactive
web site alone. "'In order to establish "minimum contacts," there
must be either transactions of a pecuniary nature between the defendant and residents of the forum state, or conduct of the defendant purposefully directed at residents in the forum. 4 ' This stan135. See supra text accompanying note 15 (explaining the Due Process
Clause's fundamental purpose).
136. D.C. Circuit Rejects Sliding Scale Approach To Finding Personal JurisdictionBased On Internet Contacts, supra note 73, at 2132. The defendant's

web site was highly interactive and generated substantial revenue, however,
the solitary source of the revenue was advertising ventures.

137. Id.
138. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,

921 (D. Or. 1999) (holding that the interactivity of the defendant's web site
was not sufficient, in and of itself, to satisfy minimum contacts). The defendant, Millennium Music, operated retail music stores located in South Carolina. Id. at 908. The defendant sold products through their retail outlets and
their Internet web site. Id. at 908. The plaintiff, Millennium Enterprises filed

a trademark infringement suit in the State of Oregon, alleging that the defendant's use of the name "Millennium Music" violated plaintiffs state and common law trademark rights. Id. at 909. The plaintiff asserted that defendant's
interactive web site, where customers can purchase compact discs, request in-

formation, and join a discount club, was a sufficient contact with Oregon residents to permit jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 913. However, the
court dismissed the claim, finding the defendant's contacts with Oregon were
insufficient to render personal jurisdiction constitutionally permissible. Id. at

924.
139. Id. at 922.
140. Id. at 921. This was a significant holding, because it validated the Bensusan court's application of Asahi in creating the passive/interactive distinc-

tion. See supra text accompanying note 109 (comparing the "stream of commerce" with creating an Internet web site). However, the court implied, the

sliding scale analysis created in Zippo was not the "something more" require-
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dard ignores the medium of communication and concentrates on
the intent of the defendant.
The court characterized the defendant's web site as interactive, within the meaning of Zippo.4' However, the court refused to
exercise personal jurisdiction, because the defendant did not act
"creating 'a substantial connection' with Oregon, or deliberately
engage in 'significant activities' within Oregon."'
The fact that someone who accessed the defendant's web site
could purchase a compact disc did not render the defendant's acIt is the conduct of a
tions purposefully directed at the forum.
defendant, not the medium utilized by them, to which parameters
A web site is not automatically
of personal jurisdiction apply.'
projected to a user's computer without invitation; the user must
take affirmative steps to turn on the computer, access the Internet, and browse the web for a particular site."' Thus, the court
held that the level of interactivity contained on the web site is not
a dispositive
factor in characterizing intent of the defendant's con46
duct.
The Conclusion of this Comment critiques the insufficiency of
the passive/interactive distinction as applied in Zippo, and proposes that courts should refine this approach by adopting a "real
space" analysis evaluating the outward manifest purpose of the defendant's conduct with particular regard afforded to the defendant's pecuniary expectancy interest in the forum state.

ment in Justice O'Connor's Asahi analysis. The court instead incorporated the
other two examples of constitutionally permissible personal jurisdiction without a physical presence. Millennium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 921. The
"something more" requirement is satisfied by either intentional transactions
with residents in the forum state, or conduct purposefully directed at forum
residents. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 65 and 68 (introducing "effects test" of Calder and intentional transactions requirement of Burger King).
141. Millennium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 920.

142. Id. at 921.
143. Id. Absent actual exchanges or transactions with forum residents, or
evidence that forum residents were targeted, defendants cannot reasonably
anticipate that they will be brought before an Oregon court. Id. at 923. It is
therefore "presumptively unreasonable to require them to submit to the burdens of litigation" in the forum. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 476 (1962)).
144. Id. at 921 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)).

145. Id. at 922. Information published on the web site is not indiscriminately thrust on the user. Id.
146. Id. at 922-23. The court stated that "the better approach is that taken
by the courts which refused to assert jurisdiction on the sole basis of an inter-

active web site... and agrees with the reasoning of those courts which have
asserted jurisdiction on the basis that the defendant's Internet conduct was

intended to reach forum residents." Id. (citing e-Data Corp. v. Micropatent
Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D. Conn. 1997) and Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen,
141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998).
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RETURNING WEB SITE INTERACTIVITY TO ITS PROPER
CONSTITUTIONAL PLACE

The advent of the Internet will inevitably make the most significant impact on human interaction since the printing press. Its
effect on economic development in the United States and throughout the world is paramount.1 47 The Internet allows the small entrepreneur to overcome the inherent obstacles created by a capitalistic economic system.'48
With the Internet, a computer-savvy
entrepreneur can enter a worldwide market economy, previously
accessible only to those with the capital available to reach specific
geographic markets.'4 9 Furthermore, the Internet will facilitate a
shift in market power to consumers, because they will be armed
with near perfect market information. 10
Thus, the United States clearly has a compelling interest in
facilitating Internet development.'
Conceiving a notion of "fair
play and substantial justice" that reconciles with the pragmatic
realities of the cyber world is absolutely vital. There is precedent
for this. '12As a post-World War II economy eviscerated meaningful geographic barriers, the Supreme Court adjusted its definition
of due process to abrogate a purely "power and presence" framework. 57 Now, public policy and pragmatic necessity advocate reexamining our notion of "fair play and substantial justice," because
Internet contacts do not fall within the territorial based paradigm. 54 However, in developing an applicable standard, the sliding scale analysis has strayed too far from traditional due process
principles.
The current application of the sliding scale analysis fails in its

147. See supra text accompanying note 13.

148. Gore, supra note 13, at 5.
149. See supra text accompanying note 6.
150. See supra text accompanying note 12.
151. Gore, supra note 13, at 2. The U.S. Government created the Electronic
Commerce Working Group to facilitate growth of e-commerce and information
technology. Id. The Clinton/Gore administration outlined numerous policy
initiatives to assure this growth. Id. Included among these principles are: requirements for meaningful consumer protection, a long term extension of the
research and development tax credit to stimulate private sector research, a
dramatic increase in federal funding for the information technology sector, a
moratorium on all tariffs for e-commerce, and adjusting our domestic and international legal regimes to the reality that the cyber-world is not consistent
with "territorial based" systems. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 31 (concluding that the
changing economic world made the rigidity of the Pennoyer standard impractical, and thus, the Court adjusted its notion of "fair play and substantial justice").

153. Shurtz, supra note 18, at 1666.
154. See supra text accompanying note 49 (concluding that Internet contacts
are unique to the paradigm established by Int'l Shoe and Hanson).
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essential purpose.'55 Only those with an entirely passive or entirely commercial web site can effectively assess their potential
amenability." 6 A web host whose site falls in the pervasive middle
ground would have difficulty knowing whether a court would define his site as "interactive."'57 This assails the essence of due
process protection because the potential defendant cannot structure his primary conduct in light of his potential amenability.
The sliding scale's failure to avail minimum assurance is economically inefficient. A prospective entrepreneur is forced to account for her broadest possible liabilities, thus her cost of production is far in excess of its true cost. The entrepreneur might forego
this efficient and accessible avenue of commerce if faced with the
"litigious nightmare of being subjected to suit" in every jurisdiction
in the country."
Those who do choose to utilize the Internet will
ultimately pass this cost onto the consumer, eradicating any economic advantage the consumer receives in a global marketplace.
The Benusan court's reliance on Justice O'Connor's "something more" standard is well placed.' 5 The Internet is sufficiently
analogous to placing a product in the stream of commerce. 160 However, defining the "something more" requirement solely in terms of
web site interactivity is illogical, inefficient, and unavailing. The
"purposeful availment" of the forum state has been achieved
through the transaction or the intended effect, not the communication. 6' Thus, the level of interactivity of the web site is not conclusive, because interactivity is a characteristic of the web site itself,
not evidence of conduct directed at any particular forum.
Courts should apply the reasoning of GTE New Media Services and Millennium Enterprises, which assess the defendant's
behavior towards the forum state. Evidence of conduct that has an
intended effect on the forum state, or results in economic transactions with forum residents provides the minimum contacts for exercising personal jurisdiction. This would be the "something more"
requirement evinced in Benusan.
155. See supra text accompanying note 127 (observing that the current application of the sliding scale analysis fails to give a reasonable level of predictability to a legal system that allows defendants to plan their conduct with reasonable assurances of where they will be required to defend suit).
156. Id. While Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce" analysis is plagued
by a similar problem, the "stream of commerce" analysis provides a degree of

fundamental fairness by focusing the inquiry on the defendant's conduct, not
the characteristic capacity of his communication medium.
157. Circuit Rejects Sliding Scale Approach, supra note 74, at 2132.
158. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,
923 (D. Or. 1999) (quoting Donnie L Kidd, Jr., Casting the Net: Another Con-

fusing Analysis of Personal Jurisdictionand Internet Contacts in Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 505, 541 (1998)).
159. See supra text accompanying note 140.
160. Benusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.

161. Id.
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A web presence actually evinces less about the defendant's
"purposeful availment" of the forum state than telephone calls,
mail, and other forms of communication. These forms of communication require less affirmative conduct by the consumer to reach
a given forum. 6 Thus, by analogy, an interactive web site is insufficient to establish any jurisdictionally significant actions. 63
However, the "nature and quality" of the defendant's purposeful
availment of the forum is significant.
A defendant who advertises his web site pervasively in the
cyber world, providing hyperlinks that create easy accessibility for
any user in any forum, is manifestly targeting a national base. In
contrast, a small business whose site is generally unadvertised,
with its accessibility generally dependent upon the affirmative
acts of consumers, is clearly not directing its web site at any specific forum, despite the web site's ubiquitous nature. In either
case, the level of interactivity should not be the material factor in
determining the validity of an exercise of personal jurisdiction.
While an entirely commercial web site, with substantial sales
in all fifty states clearly renders the host amenable in all fifty
states, this is the exception rather than the norm. A pervasive
majority of web sites will fall in the "middle area" as defined in
Zippo."4 Thus, in order to remain consistent with prior "real
space" precedent, assure a reasonable level of predictability for the
web host, and facilitate efficient means of communication, courts
should focus their inquiry on the express target of the defendant's
conduct. Web site interactivity is related to this inquiry, but the
nature of the defendant's web site promotion, the general likelihood it will be accessed by forum residents, and the nature of the
contacts with forum residents are more relevant factors in assessing a defendant's "purposeful availment of the forum."
Thus, this Comment proposes that courts refine this approach
by adopting a "real space" analysis evaluating the outward manifest purpose of a defendant's conduct. This standard will give a

162. See Millennium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (stating that a web

site is not automatically projected to a user's computer without invitation; the
user must take affirmative steps to turn on the computer, access the Internet,
and browse the web for a particular web site). By contrast, telephone calls to
the user and mail sent to his house are unquestionably directed at the resident and, thus, the forum state.
163. See id. at 921 (stating that the "something more" requirement of Justice

O'Connor's analysis would not be satisfied through an interactive web site
alone). In order to establish "minimum contacts," there must be either trans-

actions of a pecuniary nature between the defendant and residents of the forum state, or conduct of the defendant purposefully directed at residents in
the forum. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 124 and 127 (concluding that a ma-

jority of web sites will fall into the pervasive "middle ground" as defined by
Zippo).
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greater degree of predictability, because it will not focus the
court's jurisdictional inquiry on a characteristic of the web site itself, but will focus on the purposeful target of the defendant's conduct.
CONCLUSION

In Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania created the
sliding scale of interactivity to analyze cases where the defendant's web site is not definitively passive or interactive. In this
pervasive "middle ground" the dispositive inquiry is the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of that activity. However,
this test fails to properly apply Justice O'Connor's "something
more" requirement as defined in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Courtof California.
The Due Process Clause gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurances as to where that
conduct will and will not render them amenable to suit. To comport with these assurances, courts should focus their inquiry on
the defendant's conduct towards the forum. Web site interactivity
is related to this inquiry, but the nature of the defendant's web
site promotion, the general likelihood it will be accessed by forum
residents, and the nature of the contacts with forum residents are
also relevant factors in evaluating the defendant's "purposeful
availment" of the forum.

